大清和後清無知的迴旋鏢

十三號杭州回來的路上看了一個嗶站節目：帝国如何被自己骗倒？统治者无知的背后，是制度在撒谎!，這幾天這個概念一直縈繞心頭。說的是大清，指的不就是後清嗎！邪教建起了防火長城，過濾牆外信息；在牆內用單一、宏大敘事宣傳洗腦，對於不同的聲音採取警告（俗稱喝茶)、刪帖、封號、抓人判刑乃至肉體消失等等舉措大興文字獄。這不僅搞壞了普通人的腦子，也把各級官員的腦子也搞壞了。而這些各級官員的升遷都掌握在上一級乃至幾級的領導手上，所以他們就會精準的向上敘事。所以飛鏢打出去，迴旋鏢又繞回來傷到自己。

另外，對於學歷更高，官位更大的人，他們能接觸到的真相就越多，理論上就會更清醒。但是對於位階更高的人來說，說話也要格外小心，他們需要在邪教意識形態的政治正確話語體系下表達觀點，以期自己的政治安全。因此，即使他們知道實際情況怎麼樣，也只會用黨國的單一敘事論述。

另外還有一個點，邪教的升遷之路競爭劇烈，因為一但上位權力極大，因此好處很多。所以這些蠅營狗苟的人都是非常的精明且自私自利。他們都是站在自身利益的角度上考慮利弊，所以迎合上級領導的喜好又比說實話重要。當社會普遍敘事被統編後上級官員也失去了多個渠道的信息來源，比如調查記者的深度追蹤調查，輿情的反饋，這時候下一級的向上敘事就影響力倍增。

還有我沒想到的原因，種種的體制因由，造就當下後清邪教黨國官員的認知水平越來越低，低到超乎常人想像。但是常人卻用另外一種心態來看待它們：上頭是知道的，上頭這麼做總有道理的。

The Ignorance Boomerang: From the Qing to the "Latter Qing"

On my way back from Hangzhou on the 13th, I watched a Bilibili video titled "How Did the Empire Trick Itself? Behind the Ruler's Ignorance Is a System Built on Lies." Over the past few days, this concept has been stuck in my head. The video was talking about the Qing Dynasty, but isn’t it obviously pointing at the Latter Qing! This cult regime built the Great Firewall to filter out information from the outside world. Inside the wall, it uses a single, grand narrative to brainwash the public, shutting down any dissenting voices through warnings, deleted posts, banned accounts, arrests, and even total physical erasure—a modern literary persecution. This doesn't just rot the minds of ordinary citizens; it rots the minds of officials at every level. And because promotions depend entirely on higher-ups, officials tell leadership exactly what it wants to hear. In the end, the boomerang thrown into the air circles back to harm the system itself.

You’d think that higher-ranking officials with more education and broader access to uncensored facts would be more clear-headed. In theory, yes. But in reality, the higher they climb, the more carefully they have to watch their words. To ensure their political survival, they must speak within the political correctness of the cult's ideological frame. So even when they know the actual situation, they still stick to the party-state's single narrative.

On top of that, competition along the promotion path within this cult system is brutal, because reaching the top brings immense power and endless perks. These self-serving opportunists weigh every decision purely through the lens of personal gain, making pleasing their superiors more important than telling the truth. Once public discourse is completely unified, top leadership loses independent information channels—like investigative reporting or authentic public feedback. As a result, the upward narrative from subordinates carries twice the weight.

There are other structural reasons I hadn't thought of. This combination of factors drives the cognitive level of today's Latter Qing cult officials lower than ordinary people could ever imagine. Yet everyday people still view them with a naive mindset: "The top leadership knows what's going on—there must be a good reason for it."